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ABSTRACT 
 
The lack of consensus on the significance of ethnicity on civil conflict derives from the 
measures used, not from the concept’s lack of merit. Current measures, such as the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index (ELF), examine differences in demographics rather than how 
the diversity becomes politically relevant or when the diversity leads to conflict. By using 
Horowitz’s (1985) theory of ethnic voting and a measure for how closely a state’s political 
parties are aligned with ethnic groups, one can better assess how countries’ ethnic groups are 
politically organized and how this organization is associated with civil conflict. Using an original 
measure derived from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer indicating the extent to which a state’s 
political parties are aligned ethnically and the UCDP/ PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset, the 
following study finds that states with high levels of ethnic political parties are associated with an 
increased probability of civil conflict, while those states with a proportional legislative electoral 
system are associated with a decreased, though not statistically significant, probability of civil 
conflict. 
 
  
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent research has concluded that certain physical conditions within a state, such as 
mineral wealth or terrain, are more influential on the onset of civil conflict than ethnic ties. 
Fearon and Laitin go so far as to state that “the factors that explain which countries have been at 
risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that 
favor insurgency,” which they state to be poverty, terrain, political volatility, and population size 
(2003, 75). To test the effects of ethnicity on conflict, Fearon and Laitin use the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index (ELF),1 a measure of the share of the largest ethnic group, the number of 
distinct languages spoken, and religious fractionalization. Using these demographic measures, 
they find no support for the theory and instead look to the “conditions that favor insurgency.”  
While Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not find ethnicity to be a direct contributing factor in 
civil wars, they and Blimes (2006) see ethnicity as an indirect cause, as while ethnicity alone 
does not incite conflict, the social cohesion formed from common ethnicity can aid groups in 
overcoming the collective action problem (Gurr 1993; Tarrow 2011; Blimes 2006; Posen 1993; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003) when other factors are present that could lead to civil war. Ethnicity, 
then, instead of directly causing conflict “can provide natural cleavages on which society can 
fracture under stress” (Blimes 2006, 538).  
Several factors associated with ethnicity help groups united under a common ethnic 
identity to overcome the collective action problem while other societal divisions fail to overcome 
such problems. First, in many African states individuals identify as closely or more closely with 
their ethnicity than with their national citizenship (Afrobarometer 2015). Second, ethnicity is 
                                                        
1 ELF measures the probability that any two people randomly drawn from the same country 
would be from different ethnic groups. The closer the probability is to one, the more diverse the 
country and the greater the believed risk of civil war. 
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different from other societal cleavages in that defection from ethnic groups can be more difficult 
(Denny and Walter 2013) due to the view of a shared culture and common past (Horowitz 1985). 
This view of a common past increases social cohesion (Posen 1993; Blimes 2006), which leads 
to an increase in the ease of information sharing (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 
2009; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Gubler and Selway 2012), sanctioning (Horowitz 1985; 
Habyarimana et al. 2009, Blattman and Miguel 2010), and mobilization (Gurr 1993; Tarrow 
2011; Blimes 2006; Posen 1993; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Ethnicity, then, within the 
opportunity/willingness framework (Most and Starr 1989) provides the opportunity for conflict 
but does not in and of itself provide the willingness to participate in conflict. 
I argue that the willingness to act in civil conflict stems from the politicization of 
ethnicity and how this politicization affects vote choices. The combination of a low defection 
rate and a strong sense of group identity within a larger society provides ample opportunity for 
politicians to use ethnicity as a means to establish a power base. Common ethnicity in such states 
will link politicians to coethnic voters (Horowitz 1985), leading those politicians to allocate more 
material benefits to their coethnic constituents in the form of public goods, nepotism, and 
clientelism in exchange for continued political support (Cederman et al. 2010; Wucherpfennig et 
al. 2012). This politicization of ethnicity leads political parties within a state to be formed along 
ethnic lines. 
According to Horowitz’s (1985) theory of ethnic voting, when political parties form 
along ethnic lines, voting results tend to mirror the diversity within a state. In such states 
minority ethnic groups are therefore likely to be excluded from either wielding political power or 
gaining political representation. This exclusion from political power creates grievances within 
the society, increasing the probability of conflict. In summary, in states where political parties 
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form along ethnic lines, minority groups are unable to hold the government accountable and are 
therefore more likely to be disruptive to those in power.  
Previous studies evaluating links between ethnicity and conflict focus on fractionalization 
measures to operationalize the concept of ethnicity and therefore only focus on the opportunity 
aspect within the opportunity/willingness framework (Most and Starr 1989). While these 
measures do demonstrate the level of diversity within a state (the opportunity for conflict), they 
do not indicate the degree to which communities within a given state align themselves politically 
along ethnic divisions excluding other groups from political power (the willingness for conflict). 
In other words, the presence alone of multiple ethnic groups does not ensure that such groups 
will have politically activated cleavages (Cox 1997). To evaluate politically active cleavages, 
one can examine the rate at which coethnics vote for the same political party. If the separation of 
political parties along ethnic divisions is high within a state, one can deduce that ethnic voting is 
occurring within that state. By evaluating whether political parties within a state are divided 
upon ethnic lines, one can test Horowitz’s (1985) theory of ethnic voting and determine whether 
ethnicity plays a role in civil conflict.  
Through this study, I will attempt to locate the causal mechanism linking ethnicity to 
civil conflict by evaluating whether or not political parties within African states form along 
ethnic lines and if such an association can be linked to civil conflicts in each country. To do so, I 
will use survey data from Round 5 of the Afrobarometer indicating the respondents’ ethnic 
groups and political parties and civil conflict data from the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
(2015). 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Ethnicity and Collective Action 
 Benedict Anderson describes a nation as an “imagined community,” imagined because 
“the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(1983(2006), 6) and a community because of the deep comradeship based on a shared history. 
Nationalism is created based on this collective identity, and nationalism, within the defined 
borders of the state, creates the nation. What happens, though, when the majority of the citizens 
within a state do not identify with the other members or see a collective, shared past with all 
members of the state? 
Figure 1 illustrates the degree to which respondents in the 34 African states included in 
Round 5 of the Afrobarometer identify with either their ethnic group or with their national  
 
Figure 1: Frequency of Identification with Ethnic Group or National Identity 
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identity. While many citizens identify themselves either exclusively by their national identity or 
with a greater focus on their national identity than on their ethnic identity (20,797 respondents), 
ethnicity still plays a primary role in self-identification for the majority of the respondents 
(21,835 respondents). This lack of identifying strongly with a nation and instead identifying with 
an ethnic group can have political implications within a state. 
 Ethnicity, compared to other societal cleavages, can have a larger societal impact due to 
its unique properties. While ethnicity is a social construction and ethnic defections do occur 
(Kalyvas 2008), movement between ethnic groups is more difficult than movement between 
other social cleavages (Denny and Walter 2013). Group membership “is often marked by skin 
color, language, familial ties, or cultural heritage” (Gubler and Selway 2012, 210), and ethnic 
identity is seen as both being determined at birth and based on the beliefs of a collective past and 
a shared culture with other members of the group (Horowitz 1985; Cederman et al. 2010), 
organized on common religious, cultural, linguistic, racial, and/or class identities (Posner 2004a; 
Brancati 2006).  
 This view of a shared past creates dense social networks and social cohesion within 
ethnic groups that allow for ease of information sharing (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana 
et al. 2009; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Gubler and Selway 2012), sanctioning (Horowitz 1985; 
Habyarimana et al. 2009, Blattman and Miguel 2010), and mobilization (Gurr 1993; Tarrow 
2011; Blimes 2006; Posen 1993; Fearon and Laitin 2003), all of which help to overcome the 
collective action problem.  
Habyarimana et al. (2009) conduct a series of experiments to determine the causal 
mechanisms for why diversity impedes collective action and why coethnics are better able to 
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overcome collective action problems. They find that technology mechanisms and strategy 
mechanisms provide ethnic groups with the means to work collectively. 
The technology mechanisms include efficacy, where coethnics function together more 
efficiently; readability, where coethnics are able to gauge each other better than those from 
different ethnic groups; periodicity, where coethnics engage each other more frequently; and 
reachability, where coethnics are better able to find each other. In other words, “Ethnic groups 
are frequently marked by highly developed systems of social networks that allow for cheap and 
rapid transmission of information about individuals and their past histories” (Fearon and Laitin 
1996, 718), while information about members of outgroups is low or lacking.  
The strategy mechanism is that coethnics are more likely to impose sanctions and 
retaliate against those who fail to cooperate with a collective goal (Habyarimana et al. 2009). 
This ability to sanction decreases the probability of defection from collective action (Horowitz 
1985; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana et al. 2009). 
The high levels of information on coethnics along with the applying of sanctions to those 
who defect from the group’s wishes both reduce the costs of mobilization. This decreased cost 
makes it easier to recruit members within an ethnic group to a particular political party or social 
movement.  
Ethnicity, then, provides the opportunity for conflict through its ability to overcome the 
collective action problem. However, simply because ethnic groups are able to overcome the 
collective action problem through easy mobilization, information sharing, and sanctioning does 
not mean that people will engage in conflict or even identify more strongly with their ethnic 
group than with the state. While ethnic identities are determined at birth based on a view of a 
common history and shared culture with other members (Horowitz 1985), individuals make the 
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choice to identify with either their ethnic group or with the state (Penn 2008). Whichever group 
the individuals choose to identify with, they will demonstrate a bias towards that group, view a 
‘common fate’ between members of the group, see the group as distinct from others (i.e., ingroup 
versus others), and compare the relative well-being of their ingroup to others (Penn 2008). The 
politicization of ethnicity can lead individuals to identify more strongly with their ethnic group 
than with the state. 
Politicization of Ethnicity 
As I discuss below more fully below, when members of an ethnically diverse state choose 
to identify with their ethnic groups over the state as a whole it can lead to collective grievances 
and the comparison of one’s ingroup’s well-being relative to other groups. These collective 
grievances provides the impetus for collective action in the form of creating political parties 
based on ethnicity, which in turn leads to the exclusion of segments of society from the political 
power. These grievances can then provide the willingness to engage in civil conflict.  
Posner (2004b) illustrates the effects of the politicization of ethnicity through his natural 
experiment with the Chewa and Tumbuka peoples in Malawi and Zambia. His goal is to 
ascertain why ethnic differences matter within one state in social and political interactions and 
not the other. 
While both states contain members of the two ethnic groups, the cultural differences 
between the groups alone are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for conflict between the 
groups. If the differences were necessary or sufficient conditions, then the amount of conflict in 
the two states would be nearly equivalent. Instead, he finds that, while the same cleavages 
separate the two groups in both states, the differences are only politically salient in Malawi, not 
Zambia. 
 8 
In Malawi, both ethnic groups represent large portions of the society and therefore “serve 
as viable bases for political coalition-building” (Posner 2004b, 529). By contrast, the same 
groups in Zambia are small and not useful for political mobilization. 
Since the focus of politics in developing nations is in providing public goods to the state 
and resources are controlled by the national government, the group or coalition of groups that 
control the national government will receive more public goods provisions. Politicians who want 
to gain more support will draw upon cultural differences between groups, making the differences 
politically salient in order to garner more political support. He concludes, then, “that the political 
salience of a cultural cleavage depends not on the nature of the cleavage itself (since it is 
identical in both countries) but on the sizes of the groups it defines and whether or not they will 
be useful vehicles for political competition” (Posner 2004b, 529). 
While the configuring of political parties or organizations along ethnic lines can include 
more people in the political process, it simultaneously creates political systems in which certain 
groups dominate politics and others are excluded from the process (Penn 2008). This domination 
of and exclusion from the political process is what can lead to conflict. How, though, do political 
parties and organizations come to be formed along ethnic lines, creating this division that 
increases the grievances against the state and excludes segments of society from the political 
process? The next section will evaluate the formation of ethnic political parties in Africa and 
how such formations lead to political exclusion. 
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THEORY: ETHNIC VOTING 
Elections provide a means through which the people of a state are able to participate in 
government through the people’s abilities to select the “good type” of politician who will support 
policies beneficial to the electorate (Przeworski et al. 1999) and to hold leaders accountable for 
their actions through the ability to sanction politicians by removing them from office (Davenport 
2007), though this accountability is limited by the lack of clarity of responsibility (Przeworski et 
al. 1999). Elections in and of themselves, though, are not a sufficient means for the people to 
elect politicians who will maximize the welfare of all citizens. Politicians, before being able to 
enact promised beneficial policies, must first be elected to office. In order to be elected, political 
parties and politicians must raise funds and support from special interests and a base of 
supporters and also must provide the special interests and supporters with benefits for their 
support in return, (Przeworski et al. 1999) even if these benefits do not align with the best 
interests of the population as a whole. Electoral competition then becomes “the process by which 
parties exchange benefits (or promises thereof) derived from their control of political institutions 
for electoral support” (Strom 581). This exchange then gives parties votes needed and the people 
who voted for them benefits from policies enacted.  
In states where strong ethnic loyalties are present, political parties tend to organize along 
ethnic lines (Horowitz 1985; Reynal-Querol 2002) because common ethnicity aids in linking the 
politicians to the citizens, thus providing the politicians with a power base to aid in their election 
to office. The presence of different ethnic groups within a society, though, does not 
automatically equal politically active cleavages. Politicians must politicize ethnicity for personal 
gain (i.e., winning office) for ethnic political parties to form (Posner 2004b; Cox 1997). In order 
to garner and to maintain support, then, politicians allocate material benefits to their coethnic 
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constituents in the form of public goods, nepotism, and clientelism (Cederman et al. 2010; 
Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). These benefits reinforce voting for candidates within one’s ethnic 
group (Wantechekon 2003). Ethnic political parties, then, mean that politicians do not work to 
benefit diverse constituencies and are no longer held accountable by the society at large, but 
instead work for the benefit of and are accountable to their ethnic group alone. 
The parties then work to garner maximum levels of support from their own ethnic groups 
in order to increase their power base as they cannot count on defectors from other political 
parties. This lack of crossover voters also means that, when one political party forms along 
ethnic lines, others will do so as well (Horowitz 1985). Competition then makes ethnic political 
parties move to extremes in order to acquire greater support, making it so that “the position of 
one party is the negation of the other” (Horowitz 1985, 348). Thus, when parties are based on 
ethnic identity, divisions between different groups are emphasized and exacerbated.  
Ethnic political parties, supported through clientelism and the exaggeration of differences 
between ethnic groups, result in vote choices made outside of policy preferences. Voters, instead 
of voting for the party of their choice, must vote for the party aligned with their ethnic group 
regardless of the political position of the candidate (Horowitz 1985).  
Horowitz’s theory of ethnic voting illustrates how, through severe sanctioning of 
deviants, voter turnout in the midst of ethnic political parties is high (1985). The high turnout 
means that election results with ethnic political parties tend to mirror the diversity of the 
population. An election, then, “intended to be a vehicle of choice, was no such thing and will be 
no such thing in the future; it registered, not choice, but birth affiliation. There was no election—
it was a census” (Horowitz 1985, 86). When an election occurs, the ethnic groups with the 
largest populations gain the majority of the votes and therefore political power, while smaller 
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groups gain the minority of the votes and are therefore excluded from political power. The 
smaller ethnic groups will not just see this as a one-time loss, because unless the population 
numbers drastically change, the elections will always result in such a manner. The smaller 
groups are therefore excluded from political power and will not see any present or future 
possibility of this changing within the current system. This exclusion from political power 
creates grievances leading the ethnic groups with smaller vote shares to see their only hope in 
gaining political power to be through the use of violence to change the societal makeup 
(Horowitz 1985). 
Political exclusion therefore provides the motivation for civil conflict while the 
opportunity to act comes through the shared identities and common interests of the ethnic 
groups, which assist in bringing people together to overcome the collective action problem (Gurr 
1993; Tarrow 2011; Blimes 2006; Posen 1993; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Political parties divided 
along ethnic lines, then, will increase the probability of civil conflict because social cohesion 
within the ethnic groups helps to overcome the collective action problem and vote choice based 
upon ethnicity makes political changes seem possible only through violence. 
Therefore, one would expect that: 
H1: When political parties have successfully mobilized voters along ethnic divisions, the 
probability of civil conflict will increase. 
 
While executives are generally elected through majoritarian systems, legislatures can be 
elected through either a proportional or a majoritarian system. A majoritarian system would 
continue to uphold Horowitz’s (1985) ethnic voting theory that, if citizens vote along ethnic lines 
the ethnic majority will always win political power in the legislature, therefore excluding large 
segments of society from political power. If the system were proportional, ethnic voting would  
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create diversity within the legislature that would mirror the diversity of the entire state. Ethnic 
groups would not be excluded from political power, thus reducing the probability of civil 
conflict.  
Therefore, one would expect that: 
H2: When the legislature is elected through a proportional system, as opposed to a 
majoritarian or mixed system, the probability of civil conflict even in the presence of 
ethnic political parties will decrease. 
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EXTANT MEASURES 
 
Extant measures of diversity are insufficient for testing hypotheses on the effects of 
ethnicity on civil conflict because they generally focus on demographics rather than upon 
political party formations. The most commonly used measure for diversity, the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index (ELF) (Easterly and Levine 1997), uses a Herfindahl index to calculate 
the probability that any two people randomly drawn from the same state would be from different 
ethnic groups. The closer the probability is to one, the more diverse the state. Using this measure 
alone (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, DeSoysa 2002) or in combination with other measures (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003,2 Collier and Hoeffler 20043), studies find the correlation between ethnic 
diversity and civil war to be spurious when one controls for other variables.  
 Several additional measures have been constructed to test diversity, but due to the 
complicated nature of ethnicity, these measures also generally fail to identify salient divisions. 
Two main issues complicate the understanding of ethnic groups in relation to how they affect 
political affiliation and, therefore, civil conflict: correctly categorizing the identities of and 
relationships between groups and identifying the nature and strength of divisive social cleavages. 
The first issue stems from the fact that many ethnic groups have subsets within the larger 
group, meaning that several groups identified as separate by a particular measure might actually 
view themselves as part of a larger whole of related peoples. Conversely, sometimes two smaller 
groups can be inappropriately classified together within a larger group. Under ELF, the Hutus 
and Tutsis of Rwanda were classified as one group, but were not aligned with one another                                                         
2 Fearon and Laitin (2003) use a measure of the share of the largest ethnic group, the number of 
distinct languages spoken, and a measure of religious fractionalization in addition to ELF. 
 
3 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use a measure of social fractionalization as well as a measure of 
ethnic dominance, defined as existing when the largest ethnic group consists of 45-90% of the 
state’s total population. 
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politically.  To address this issue, Roeder (2001) creates an index in which he divides ethnic 
groups along different possible subsets, creating three different lists of groups, removing some of 
the coding errors of ELF, and allowing researchers to look at the different classifications of 
groups. However, his measure still fails to identify the relationships between groups (whether 
they are positive or not), the cleavages between them, and the strengths of those cleavages, 
meaning that it too is not useful for predicting civil conflict. 
The second issue is that ethnic groups might be divided along different social cleavages 
in different states, making a cross-national analysis using one cleavage inappropriate for all 
states. While Alesina et al. (2003) create measures for ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
fractionalization, they fail to identify along which line each state does or does not have a 
fracture. Building from this concept, Fearon (2003) focuses on structural differences between the 
languages of different ethnic and religious groups, attempting to show cultural distance between 
groups by showing how the structures of the languages differ within a state.4 This measure, 
though, assumes that language is the major area of division among ethnic groups in all states, and 
this may not always be the case, again making cross-national analysis inaccurate. For example, 
while languages in the former Yugoslavian states are all structurally similar, the society fractured 
along religious and ethnic lines during their civil conflict. A cross-national study using linguistic 
structural differences would, therefore, incorrectly predict the occurrence of civil conflict in the 
former Yugoslavian states. 
Posner (2004a) recognizes these two issues and seeks to create a measure based on the 
political activity of different ethnic groups within a state, specifically the African states. He 
                                                        
4 Fearon’s (2003) measure identifies the probability that two people randomly drawn from the 
same state would speak similar languages. The probability will be close to 1 if the languages are 
structurally similar and close to 0 if they are dissimilar. 
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researches the ethnic groups considered politically relevant within states, defined as groups 
mentioned in relation to politics in books, newspaper articles, and academic journals. He then 
creates a Herfindahl concentration formula to show the proportion of what he deems politically 
relevant ethnic groups (PREG) within a society. Some groups, though, may be excluded from his 
measure specifically because they are excluded from political participation. As this exclusion 
from participation may be a direct cause of conflict, such as with the Tuareg in Mali, further 
exclusion from the measure would be inappropriate when examining the relationships between 
ethnicity, politics, and civil war. 
Cederman and Girardin (2007) and Minorities at Risk (Asal et al. 2008) both add aspects 
to evaluate political exclusion. In Cederman and Girardin’s ethno-nationalist exclusion index 
(N*), they define each ethnic group in a state either as the ethnic group in power (EGIP) or as a 
marginalized ethnic group (MEG), meaning a group excluded from political power. Using their 
N* measure, they find violence more likely when the EGIP is from a minority group. Fearon et 
al. (2007), though, point out that an ethnic minority was the EGIP in only four of the 88 states 
investigated, meaning that, if only one state was recoded, the results would lose statistical 
significance. 
Minorities at Risk, by contrast, evaluates the political situation in 117 states and follows 
2825 politically active ethnic groups with populations greater than 500,000.6 Only groups 
considered as being ‘at risk’ are included, though. For example, Bulgaria has three main ethnic 
                                                        
5 While the website states 284, the codebook includes 282 groups. 
 
6 The criteria for groups to be considered ‘at risk’ are: that groups’ memberships are determined 
by members and nonmembers; that a sense of importance is associated with group membership; 
that cultural features, such as customs, religion, or language, are shared among group members; 
that the cultural features must be practiced by a majority of group members; and that the group 
must represent either one-percent of the population or 100,000 people, whichever is lesser. 
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groups, the Bulgarians, the Roma, and the Turks. Only the Roma and the Turks are included in 
the dataset since only they are considered ‘at risk,’ while Bulgarians are excluded. This 
classification makes analysis of conflict difficult, as aspects of the dependent variable are 
included in the setup of the dataset, creating bias. 
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DATA AND MEASUREMENTS 
What is needed in order to locate the causal mechanism linking ethnic diversity to civil 
conflict is a measure that captures both the political relevance and the political exclusion of 
ethnic groups within a state. Whether or not political parties are formed along ethnic divisions is 
one way to address this concern. In order to avoid the complications other measures have 
encountered with defining ethnic groups within a state, survey data can be used in which 
respondents self-identify both ethnicity and political party preference. The Afrobarometer 
includes questions for both in Rounds 3, 4, and 5. For this purposes of this paper, though, I will 
use the metric created for Round 5 due to the inclusion of 27 countries compared to 16 and 19 
countries for Rounds 3 and 4, respectively. Checks for time-invariance of the measure are 
discussed below. The dataset is structured with the country-year as the unit of analysis, with 378 
total observations for the 27 countries over the fourteen years from 2000 to 2013. 
Independent Variables 
In order to measure the degree to which political parties in African states form along 
ethnic lines, I created a measure using two questions asked in the Afrobarometer: “What is your 
ethnic community, cultural group, or tribe?” and “Do you feel close to any particular political 
party? Which party is that?” A cross-tabulation of these two questions indicates the amount of 
people in each ethnic group who feel close to each political party. The Afrobarometer allows 
respondents to self-identify political party and ethnicity rather than choosing from a prepared list 
of ethnic groups and parties in the state. The result is that some parties only had one to a few 
respondents identifying membership. To avoid such parties skewing the results, any party not 
receiving at least five-percent of the vote from any ethnic group was removed from the dataset. 
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Respondents who identified party choice as other, not applicable, or do not know and those who 
were not asked or those with missing data were also removed from the dataset.  
From here, I generated the Herfindahl concentration formula: 𝐻(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝) =
(∑ 𝑠𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 ) (𝑝𝑖), where 𝑠𝑖2 is the share of ethnic group i in each political party, and 𝑝𝑖 is the 
proportion of the ethnic group to the total sample population from the state. This measure 
demonstrates the probability that any two people randomly drawn from one ethnic group would 
be from the same political party, weighted for the size of the ethnic group. Numbers close to 1 
indicate a high probability of two co-ethnics belonging to the same political party and numbers 
close to 0 indicate a low probability of such. While H(Group) does indicate whether or not 
members of the same ethnic group vote along similar lines, it does not yet show whether or not 
political parties are formed along ethnic lines, since several ethnic groups could all vote for the 
same political party. In order to capture the concept of the degree to which other ethnic groups 
vote for the same political party, I also generated the Herfindahl concentration formula to show 
the probability that two people randomly drawn from the same political party would be from the 
same ethnic group, weighted for the size of the political party. That formula is: 𝐻(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦) =
(∑ 𝑠𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 ) (𝑝𝑖), where 𝑠𝑖2 is the share of political party i in each ethnic group, and 𝑝𝑖 is the 
proportion of the political party to the total sample population from the state. H(Group) and 
H(Party) are then interacted with each other to create a country score for each state. Numbers 
close to 1 indicate a high probability of two people from the same political party being co-ethnics 
while numbers close to 0 indicate a low probability of such. The resulting variable, EthnicParty, 
is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater levels of 
ethnic voting. For an example metric, see Appendix Table 9. Table 1 lists the ethnic party score 
for each country. While the measure has the capacity to run from 0 to 1, all of the  
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  Table 1: Ethnic Party Score by Country 
 
 
  Country 
 
Ethnic Party Score 
 
 
  Benin 
 
 
0.1605170  
 Botswana 0.0520464  
 Burkina Faso 0.1623485  
 Burundi 0.6642144  
 Cameroon 0.0945853  
 Côte d’Ivoire 0.5151948  
 Ghana 0.2350929  
 Guinea 0.3597646  
 Kenya 0.1492057  
 Lesotho 0.0451729  
 Liberia 0.0710765  
 Madagascar 0.0738843  
 Malawi 0.1151922  
 Mali 0.0536527  
 Mauritius 0.3188097  
 Mozambique 0.1201208  
 Namibia 0.2903441  
 Niger 0.1595229  
 Nigeria 0.1310653  
 Senegal 0.1161529  
 Sierra Leone 0.2800359  
 South Africa 0.1369537  
 Tanzania 0.0287226  
 Togo 0.1142364  
 Uganda 0.0589902  
 Zambia 0.1070491  
 Zimbabwe 0.0812928 
 
 
  
African states included in the dataset range from 0.029 (Tanzania) to 0.664 (Burundi). To 
achieve a score of 1, all members of an ethnic group would need to vote for only one political 
party and no member of a different group would vote for that party. These qualifications would 
need to hold true for all political parties within a state. The lack of the measure reaching 1 does 
not indicate that ethnicity does not play a role in political party formation but rather that no 
African state included in the dataset has all of its political parties formed solely on ethnic lines.  
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  Table 2. Correlation Matrix Comparing Afrobarometer Metrics 
for Rounds 3, 4, and 5 
 
 
 
   Round 3 
 
Round 4 
 
Round 5  
 Round 3 1.000    
 Round 4 0.843 1.000   
 Round 5 0.858 0.901 1.000 
 
 
 
Round 5 Afrobarometer data for the years 2011 to 2013 is used to create the measure in 
the dataset. In order to demonstrate the time-invariance of the measure, I create the metric for 
Round 3 from the year 2005 and Round 47 from 2008 to 2009 and compare the results between 
the three rounds in a correlation matrix, illustrated in Table 2. The high correlation throughout 
the time period indicates the time-invariance of the measure and the applicableness of using the 
Round 5 values for the timeframe under investigation. The dataset, then, covers the fourteen 
years from 2000 to 2013 for 27 states resulting in 378 possible observations with the country-
year is the unit of analysis.      
To test the second hypothesis that proportional legislative systems increase the 
probability of civil conflict, I use the variable Proportional. This variable is created from data 
compiled from the CIA World Factbook and from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (1999). It is coded a 1 if the state uses a proportional system for electing the 
legislature and a 0 if the state uses a majoritarian or a mixed system in the given country-year.   
Dependent Variable 
 The standard definition for civil conflict is greater than or equal to 25 battle-related 
deaths in one year due to an internal conflict, while for civil war the definition includes an 
internal conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year (Blattman and Miguel 
2010). The UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict dataset includes measures for both, with a civil conflict                                                         
7 Rounds 1 and 2 did not ask the respondents to identify their ethnicity only their language, 
therefore these two rounds were not used.  
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being a minor-intensity conflict and a civil war being a major-intensity conflict. Here, MinorInt 
is a minor-intensity conflict, coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset as 25 to 999 
battle-related deaths in the given year for both internal armed conflicts between a state’s 
government and at least one internal opposition group and for conflicts between a state’s 
government and at least one internal opposition group with intervention from other states. A 1 
indicates a minor-intensity conflict in the state in the given year whereas 0 indicates all others. 
Within the dataset, there are 44 instances of minor conflict, 12.22 percent of the observations. 
MajorInt is a major-intensity conflict or war, coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
as over 1,000 battle-related deaths in the given year for both internal armed conflicts between a 
state’s government and at least one internal opposition group and for conflicts between a state’s 
government and at least one internal opposition group with intervention from other states. A 1 
indicates a major-intensity conflict in the state in the given year whereas 0 indicates all others. 
There are only seven instances of major conflict or 2 percent of the observations. MajorOrMinor 
is coded 1 to indicate either a major or minor intensity conflict in the state in the given year, 
whereas 0 indicates all others. There are 51 instances of major or minor conflict or 18 percent of 
the observations. Each intensity level will be evaluated in the results section. With dichotomous 
dependent variables, I will be using logistic regression to test the hypothesis of an association 
between ethnic voting and an increased probability of civil conflict. Standard errors will be 
clustered by country. 
Control Variables 
In order to indicate that it is ethnic political parties, rather than mere ethnic 
fractionalization within a state, that contributes to civil conflict, the control variable ELF is 
included in the analysis, based on a Herfindahl concentration formula (𝐸𝐿𝐹 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1 , 
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where 𝑠𝑖2 is the share of ethnic group i). It is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1 and 
measuring the probability that any two people randomly drawn from the same country would be 
from different ethno-linguistic groups. The closer the probability is to 1, the more diverse the 
country and the greater the believed risk of civil conflict. This measure is taken from Fearon and 
Laitin’s 2003 replication dataset. 
Strong states, whether democracies or authoritarian states, are less prone to civil war 
onset (Huntington 1968), while semi-democracies, countries that are neither fully autocratic nor 
democratic, are at a greater risk of civil conflict (Gurr 1993; Hegre et al. 2001; Gleditsch and 
Ruggeri 2010). The Anocracy variable controls for this effect and is derived from the Polity2 
score for each country from the Polity IV Project’s Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions dataset. The Polity2 score is computed by subtracting a state’s autocracy score from 
its democracy score, resulting in a range from -10 for full autocracies to 10 for full democracies, 
where scores of -10 to -6 represent autocracies, scores of -5 to 5 represent anocracies, and scores 
of 6 to 10 represent democracies (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). Anocracy, then, is a 
dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating states with a Polity2 score between -5 and 5 and a 0 for 
all others. While strong states are less likely to encounter civil conflict whether democratic or 
authoritarian, democracies encounter a more stable and just domestic peace (Hegre et al. 2001), 
leading to the inclusion of the Polity2 variable as a control as well. Here, one would expect 
higher values of the Polity2 variable, indicating stabler democracies, to be correlated with a 
lower risk of civil conflict.  
Primary commodity exports encourage rent-seeking behavior in rebels and increase the 
probability of civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; DeSoysa 
2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Ross 2012), with oil being the resource most 
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directly associated with civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2012). Natural resources, 
especially oil, need only be extracted, not manufactured. As such, the industries employ only a 
small segment of society, if any at all, meaning that oil and natural resource production only 
directly benefits a few (Humphreys et al. 2007). The large influx of wealth from oil, coupled 
with the lack of transparency surrounding it, also helps encourage rent-seeking behavior by those 
in power (Humphreys et al. 2007). This wealth assists leaders in reducing tax rates on citizens 
and decreasing the bureaucracy needed to extract rents or taxes from the citizenry, making the 
government unaccountable to the people at large; allowing increased spending on the military, 
permitting the political leaders to maintain control; and concealing corruption from public 
scrutiny (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys et al. 2007; Ross 2012). Therefore, the higher the 
percentage of a state’s GDP derived from oil and natural resource wealth, the less the 
government will be accountable to the people, the greater the rent-seeking behavior of those in 
power, and the more incentives that are presented to insurgents trying to win state power. 
Increased oil and natural resource exports, then, should be associated with an increased 
probability of civil conflict. Oil is measured as the state’s total oil rents as a percentage of the 
state’s GDP, and NatRes measures the total natural resource rents as a percentage of the state’s 
GDP, both taken from the World Bank’s World Development indicators. 
Conflict is more likely in the face of an indivisible issue (Toft 2003; Fearon 1995). Land 
within a state can become an indivisible issue when a geographically concentrated ethnic group 
wants sovereignty over the area, especially if this area is seen as a homeland (Horowitz 1985; 
Toft 2003; Denny and Walter 2013) and the state does not see the territory as divisible (Toft 
2003). When groups are dispersed across the country or live only in cities, land will not lead to 
an indivisible issue. The geographic concentration of ethnic groups also more easily allows 
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groups to overcome collective action problems (Toft 2003; Roessler 2011, Denny and Walter 
2013). Therefore, if even one ethnic group is geographically concentrated, the probability of civil 
conflict should increase. The inclusion of the variable Regional controls for regionally based 
ethnic groups. A 1 indicates at least one ethnic group in a state being regionally based within the 
country-year, where regionally based is defined as living in a particular region that is “easily 
distinguishable on a map” (Vogt et al. 2014). A 0 indicates all other states. This variable is 
derived from the Ethnic Power Relations Settlement Patterns dataset.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003) state that it is not ethnic diversity but rather the “conditions that 
favor insurgency,” namely population size, rough terrain, political instability, and poverty, that 
increase the probability of civil war onset. A large population increases the number of possible 
insurgents and decreases the state’s ability to follow the actions of individuals or groups within 
the state. As population increases, then, one would expect to observe an increase in the 
probability of civil conflict. The variable LogPop is the natural log of the population for each 
state by country-year, derived from the World Bank’s World Development indicators. The 
natural log of the variable is used due to the decreasing marginal effect of population as a state’s 
population increases (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  
Similarly, rough terrain decreases the government’s ability to maintain accurate and 
timely intelligence on individuals and groups and provides safe locations for insurgents to hide 
from state agents (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The presence of rough terrain within a state should 
be associated with an increase in the probability that an insurgent group would rebel against a 
state government due to the protection that the terrain provides. Mountain is taken from Fearon 
and Laitin’s 2003 dataset and is the proportion of a country that is mountainous.  
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Political instability may “indicate disorganization and weakness and thus an opportunity 
for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion” (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Regime changes are more 
likely to cause political instability (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), thus one would 
expect to see a greater probability of civil conflict within a few years of a regime change. 
Durable is taken from the Polity IV Project’s Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 
dataset. This variable measures the number of years since the most recent regime change, defined 
as a 3-point change in the state’s Polity score in three years or less. A higher score indicates a 
state with lower instability, thus a lower expected probability of civil conflict. 
Lastly, low GDP per capita is commonly associated with civil conflict, though the 
possibility of reverse causality, where conflict decreases the GDP per capita through the loss of 
life and decrease in living standards, remains (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Regardless, when the 
economy is bad, recruitment of insurgents becomes easier due to the lack of alternative income 
streams and the lowered ability of the government to police or to participate in 
counterinsurgency activities (Fearon and Laitin 2003). One would expect, then, that as individual 
incomes rise, the probability of civil conflict would decrease. Since there are diminishing 
marginal effects as the GDP increases, the natural log of the GDP per capita is more appropriate. 
LogGDPpc is the natural log of the GDP per capita for each country-year from the World Bank’s 
World Development indicators. 
Tables containing descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix with all independent and 
control variables can be found in the Appendix (Table 10 and Table 11). Due to the high 
collinearlity between Anocracy and Polity2 (r = -0.803) and because the Anocracy variable more 
closely aligns with the theory under investigation, the Polity2 variable is dropped from the 
empirical analysis. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Models 1 through 8 in Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the logistic regression 
analyses for the tests of the first hypothesis on the effects of ethnic political parties on civil 
conflict. Models 1 through 4 evaluate minor intensity conflicts while Models 5 through 8 
evaluate major or minor intensity conflicts combined. Due to the high value of the constant in  
  Table 3: Logistic Regression: Effects of Ethnic Parties on Minor Intensity Civil Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
Minor 
Intensity 
(1) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(2) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
Without 
Outliers 
 (3) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
Without Outliers 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(4) 
--------------- 
 
 
 EthnicParty 2.845 2.846 2.638 2.638  
  (1.784) (1.784) (1.863) (1.863)  
 ELF 3.914* 3.914* 4.125* 4.125*  
  (2.364) (2.364) (2.412) (2.411)  
 Anocracy -0.031 -0.031 -0.045 -0.045  
  (0.704) (0.704) (0.745) (0.745)  
 Oil -0.102 -0.102 -0.112 -0.112  
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085)  
 NatRes 0.058 0.058 0.068 0.068  
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044)  
 Regional  -0.930 -0.930 -0.934 -0.934  
  (1.323) (1.323) (1.333) (1.333)  
 LogPop 1.008 1.008 1.009 1.009  
  (0.673) (0.673) (0.678) (0.679)  
 Mountain  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)  
 Durable -0.061 -0.061 -0.066 -0.066  
  (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064)  
 LogGDPpc -0.690* -0.690* -0.670* -0.671*  
  (0.379) (0.379) (0.387) (0.387)  
 Constant -17.127 -1.590 -17.445 -1.581  
  (11.183) (1.264) (11.388) (1.296)  
 Observations 360 360 358 358  
 Pseudo R2 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.169 
 
 
  Notes: Entries are coefficients from a logistic regression; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; Models 2 and 4 use centered non-discrete continuous variables.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
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  Table 4: Logistic Regression: Effects of Ethnic Parties on Major or Minor Intensity Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
Major or 
Minor 
Intensity 
(5) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor 
Intensity with 
Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(6) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor 
Intensity 
Without 
Outliers 
 (7) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor  
Without Outliers 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(8) 
--------------- 
 
 
 EthnicParty 2.799* 2.799* 2.851* 2.851*  
  (1.564) (1.564) (1.565) (1.565)  
 ELF 3.624 3.624 3.739 3.739  
  (2.531) (2.531) (2.522) (2.522)  
 Anocracy 0.418 0.418 0.332 0.332  
  (0.812) (0.812) (0.808) (0.808)  
 Oil -0.114 -0.114 -0.106 -0.106  
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.087) (0.087)  
 NatRes 0.070* 0.070* 0.063 0.063  
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.043)  
 Regional  -0.812 -0.812 -0.837 -0.837  
  (1.332) (1.332) (1.323) (1.323)  
 LogPop 1.039 1.039 1.022 1.022  
  (0.682) (0.682) (0.695) (0.695)  
 Mountain  0.012 0.012 0.010 0.010  
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)  
 Durable -0.053 -0.053 -0.048 -0.048  
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  
 LogGDPpc -0.715 -0.715 -0.736* -0.736*  
  (0.459) (0.459) (0.447) (0.447)  
 Constant -17.806 -1.902 -17.356 -1.858  
  (11.469) (1.320) (11.721) (1.310)  
 Observations 360 360 357 357  
 Pseudo R2 0.212 0.212 0.185 0.185 
 
 
  Notes: Entries are coefficients from a logistic regression; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; Models 6 and 8 use centered non-discrete continuous variables.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
   
 
 
Models 1 and 5, Models 2 and 6 rerun the same analyses but with centered continuous non-
discrete explanatory and control variables. Centering the variables in all models reduces the 
amount of the constant’s coefficient but does not alter the strength or directionality of any other 
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variable. Models 3 and 7 drop potential outliers8 and Models 4 and 8 assess the models without 
outliers with centered non-discrete continuous variables. Again, the centered variables only have 
an effect on the coefficient of the constants, not on the coefficients of the explanatory and control 
variables. When evaluating only minor intensity conflicts, the EthnicParty variable’s coefficient, 
while not statistically significant (p = 0.056), is in the anticipated direction. When major 
conflicts are incorporated into the analysis as well, the variable reaches statistical significance (p 
= 0.037) in the hypothesized direction.  
Since there are only seven cases of major intensity conflict in the dataset, each occurring 
when the state is an anocracy, a logistic regression evaluating major intensity conflicts alone 
results in perfect prediction. Anocracy is then automatically omitted from the model due to 
collinearity, which causes all but 176 observations to be dropped. Out of the observations 
remaining, none represent major intensity conflict. Due to the lack of variance of the dependent 
variable, all independent and control variables become statistically insignificant except for 
natural resources as a percent of GDP, which remains significant (p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
Therefore, no model presented evaluates major conflicts alone. Rather Models 5 through 8 
evaluate the combination of major and minor conflicts. 
Table 5 illustrates the predicted probability of conflict for a one-standard deviation 
difference in continuous variables and a one-unit difference in binary variables. A one-standard 
deviation increase in ethnic political parties within a state results in a 4.3 percent increase in the 
probability of minor intensity conflict and a 4.4 percent increase in the probability of a major or 
minor intensity conflict. Ethnic fractionalization has a more drastic, though not statistically 
significant, effect on the probability of conflict. A one-standard deviation increase in ethno- 
                                                        8 Graphs for potential outliers in these two models can be found in Appendix Figures 4 and 5. 
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Table 5: Predicted Probability of Conflict 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Minor Intensity 
 
Major or Minor Intensity  
 
 
EthnicParty 
 
0.043* 
 
0.044*  
  (0.026) (0.023)  
 ELF 0.104 0.098  
  (0.073) (0.076)  
 Anocracy -0.003 0.040  
  (0.065) (0.073)  
 Oil -0.046 -0.055  
  (0.034) (0.037)  
 NatRes 0.061 0.078*  
  (0.047) (0.047)  
 Regional  -0.103 -0.092  
  (0.171) (0.171)  
 LogPop 0.133 0.140  
  (0.107) (0.106)  
 Mountain  0.002 0.025  
  (0.045) (0.055)  
 Durable -0.047 -0.045  
  (0.043) (0.041)  
 LogGDPpc -0.052* -0.059*  
  (0.023) 
 
(0.032)  
 
 
Notes: Entries are differences in predicted probabilities for a one-
standard deviation difference in continuous variables and a one-
unit difference in binary variables; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
 
 
linguistic fractionalization within a state results in a 10.4 percent increase in the probability of 
minor intensity conflict and a 9.8 percent increase in the probability of major or minor intensity 
conflict. Out of the ‘conditions that favor insurgency,’ only the GDP per capita indicates a 
statistically significant change in the predicted probability of conflict, with a 5.2 percent decrease 
in minor conflicts and a 5.9 percent decrease in major or minor conflicts as the state’s GDP per 
capita increases. These results provide strong support for hypothesis 1, indicating that an 
increase in ethnic political parties within the 27 states in the dataset is associated with an 
increased probability of conflict. Within these states, ethnic political parties provide a stronger 
explanation for the probability of conflict than do the ‘conditions that favor insurgency.’ 
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Figure 2 provides an illustration of the relationship between ethnic political parties and 
the predicted probability of conflict with all other variables held at their means. While similar in 
shape and confidence intervals, the probability of conflict increases slightly more rapidly for 
major or minor conflicts as ethnic parties increase than it does for minor intensity conflicts only. 
While an interaction would be more appropriate to test the effects of ethnic political 
parties in states with proportional or majoritarian legislative systems on conflict as the effects of 
proportional systems may vary across different levels of ethnic political parties, the current data 
are insufficient to test such a relationship. Instead, I include Proportional as an explanatory 
variable in Models 9 through 16 in Tables 6 and 7 and then evaluate the relationship of ethnic 
political parties to conflict across the two different values of the Proportional variable. Table 6 
focuses on minor intensity conflict while Table 7 evaluates the effects of ethnic political parties 
and proportional systems on major and minor intensity conflicts. Again, due to the low amount 
of observations for major intensity conflicts, an independent analysis of these conflicts is not 
possible. These seven observations are therefore grouped with minor intensity conflicts for the 
analyses in Table 7. 
  
      
Figure 2: Comparison of the Predicted Probability of Minor Intensity Conflict to Major or 
Minor Intensity Conflict across Different Values of Ethnic Political Parties 
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  Table 6: Logistic Regression: Effects of Ethnic Parties on Minor Intensity Conflict 
Controlling for Proportional Legislative Electoral Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
Minor 
Intensity 
(9) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(10) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
Without 
Outlier 
 (11) 
--------------- 
 
Minor Intensity 
Without Outlier 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(12) 
--------------- 
 
 
 EthnicParty 3.056* 3.056* 2.842* 2.842*  
  (1.656) (1.656) (1.699) (1.699)  
 Proportional -0.844 -0.844 -0.849 -0.849  
  (0.694) (0.694) (0.720) (0.720)  
 ELF 3.360 3.360 3.410 3.410  
  (2.176) (2.176) (2.211) (2.211)  
 Anocracy -0.004 -0.004 0.033 0.033  
  (0.710) (0.710) (0.728) (0.728)  
 Oil -0.111 -0.111 -0.125 -0.125  
  (0.083) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086)  
 NatRes 0.059 0.059 0.073* 0.073*  
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043)  
 Regional  -1.403 -1.403 -1.397 -1.397  
  (1.231) (1.231) (1.250) (1.250)  
 LogPop 1.088 1.088 1.111 1.111  
  (0.693) (0.693) (0.698) (0.698)  
 Mountain  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004  
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
 Durable -0.047 -0.047 -0.054 -0.054  
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063)  
 LogGDPpc -0.720* -0.720* -0.693* -0.693*  
  (0.371) (0.371) (0.380) (0.380)  
 Constant -17.366 -1.120 -18.050 -1.130  
  (11.183) (1.188) (11.326) (1.223)  
 Observations 360 360 359 359  
 Pseudo R2 0.175 0.175 0.185 0.185  
  Notes: Entries are coefficients from a logistic regression; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; Models 10 and 12 use centered non-discrete continuous variables.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
   
 
  
Models 9 and 13 evaluate the effects of ethnic political parties and proportional legislative 
electoral systems on conflict at minor and major or minor intensities, respectively. Models 10 
and 14 rerun the analyses with centered non-discrete continuous variables due to the high  
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  Table 7: Logistic Regression: Effects of Ethnic Parties on Major or Minor Intensity Conflict 
Controlling for Proportional Legislative Electoral Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
Major or 
Minor 
Intensity 
(13) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor 
Intensity with 
Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(14) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor 
Intensity 
Without 
Outlier 
 (15) 
--------------- 
 
Major or Minor 
Without Outlier 
with Centered 
Continuous 
Variables 
(16) 
--------------- 
 
 
 EthnicParty 3.115* 3.115* 3.115* 3.115*  
  (1.534) (1.534) (1.516) (1.516)  
 Proportional -0.891 -0.891 -0.915 -0.915  
  (0.730) (0.730) (0.720) (0.720)  
 ELF 3.059 3.059 3.153 3.153  
  (2.293) (2.293) (2.277) (2.277)  
 Anocracy 0.443 0.443 0.356 0.356  
  (0.800) (0.800) (0.798) (0.798)  
 Oil -0.122 -0.122 -0.115 -0.115  
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.091) (0.091)  
 NatRes 0.071* 0.071* 0.063 0.063  
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)  
 Regional  -1.299 -1.299 -1.337 -1.337  
  (1.242) (1.242) (1.226) (1.226)  
 LogPop 1.131 1.131 1.114 1.114  
  (0.719) (0.719) (0.730) (0.730)  
 Mountain  0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005  
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
 Durable -0.036 -0.036 -0.031 -0.031  
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)  
 LogGDPpc -0.789* -0.789* -0.803* -0.803*  
  (0.474) (0.474) (0.462) (0.462)  
 Constant -17.978 -1.452 -17.525 -1.386  
  (11.550) (1.206) (11.801) (1.195)  
 Observations 360 360 357 357  
 Pseudo R2 0.220 0.220 0.194 0.194  
  Notes: Entries are coefficients from a logistic regression; robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; Models 14 and 16 use centered non-discrete continuous variables.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
   
 
 
coefficients for the constants. The centered variables only reduce the coefficients for the 
constants; they do not affect the amplitude or directionality of the coefficients for the explanatory 
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and control variables. Models 11 and 15 remove possible outliers from the dataset,9 and Models 
12 and 16 rerun the models without outliers with centered non-discrete continuous variables. The 
directionality and statistical significance for the main explanatory variables hold throughout the 
robustness checks. While ethnic political parties remain positive and statistically significant (p < 
0.05) throughout the models, indicating that ethnic political parties increase the logged odds of 
conflict, the Proportional variable is negative and fails to achieve statistical significance. This 
preliminary analysis indicates that the presence of proportional legislative electoral systems 
reduce the logged odds of conflict, though not by a statistically significant amount. 
 Table 8 provides a clearer picture of the effect of the explanatory variables on conflict by 
illustrating how each variable affects the predicted probability of conflict. For both minor and   
major or minor intensity conflicts, ethnic political parties increase the predicted probabilities of 
conflict. Ethnic political parties increase the probability by 4.6 percentage points for a minor 
intensity conflict and 4.9 percentage points for a major or minor intensity conflict, only slightly 
higher than the analyses without the Proportional variable. Based on this analysis, proportional 
legislative electoral systems reduce the probability of minor intensity conflicts by 6.8 percent and 
major or minor intensity conflicts by 7.6 percent, though neither reduction is statistically 
significant. Again, the only variable associated with the ‘conditions that favor insurgency’ that 
has a statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of conflict is the GDP per capita, 
which decreases the probability of minor intensity conflict by 5.4 percentage points and the 
probability of major or minor intensity conflicts by 6.3 percentage points. These results indicate 
that proportional legislative electoral systems may reduce the probability of conflict, providing 
weak support for hypothesis 2. 
                                                        9 Graphs for potential outliers in these two models can be found in Appendix Figures 6 and 7. 
 34 
 
 
Table 8: Predicted Probability of Conflict Controlling for 
Proportional Legislative Electoral Systems 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Minor Intensity 
 
Major or Minor Intensity  
 
 
EthnicParty 
 
0.046* 
 
0.049*  
  (0.025) (0.024)  
 Proportional -0.068 -0.076  
  (0.053) (0.059)  
 ELF 0.086 0.080  
  (0.064) (0.066)  
 Anocracy -0.000 0.042  
  (0.064) (0.071)  
 Oil -0.049 -0.058  
  (0.034) (0.037)  
 NatRes 0.062 0.078  
  (0.047) (0.047)  
 Regional  -0.164 -0.154  
  (0.170) (0.167)  
 LogPop 0.144 0.152  
  (0.110) (0.110)  
 Mountain  -0.006 0.014  
  (0.043) (0.053)  
 Durable -0.037 -0.032  
  (0.043) (0.045)  
 LogGDPpc -0.054** -0.063*  
  (0.022) 
 
(0.031)  
 
 
Notes: Entries are differences in predicted probabilities for a one-
standard deviation difference in continuous variables and a one-
unit difference in binary variables; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 supports these findings. In this figure, one can see that the effects of ethnic 
political parties on conflict do indeed vary between proportional systems and non-proportional 
(majoritarian and mixed) systems, where those states with proportional legislative electoral 
systems have a lower probability of conflict than those states without a proportional system. 
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Figure 3: Probability of Conflict in Proportional and Non-Proportional Legislative Electoral 
Systems  
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CASE STUDY 
The results of the statistical analysis indicate a clear association between ethnic political 
parties and an increase in civil conflict for the years 2000 to 2013. Data for previous years are 
not available since the data are derived from the Afrobarometer, which only began surveying in 
1999. In order to test the first hypothesis for this study before the year 2000, I will conduct two 
case studies: one in Mali and another in Nigeria. These two states were chosen due to their high 
levels of ethnic diversity and their history of civil wars attributed to ethnic conflict. 
Mali had an ethnic civil war from 1989 to 1994 in which the rebels sought autonomy. For 
the time period of 1945 to 1999, its ELF score was .7783, indicating high fractionalization along 
ethnic lines. Nigeria also had an ethnic civil war (1967 to 1970) in which the opposition forces 
sought autonomy. The ELF score in Nigeria is .8629, also indicating high ethnic diversity 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
The measure described in the previous statistical section indicates that political party 
choice is presently more defined by ethnic groups in Nigeria (0.1310653) than in Mali 
(0.0536527), providing initial support to the hypothesis that ethnically based political parties 
contribute to civil war onset in Nigeria but challenging the idea that such parties led to fighting 
in Mali. A historical examination of the two states supports the assumptions provided by the 
measure, but, while Mali’s civil wars are still focused on political exclusion, it is the political 
exclusion of one ethnic group while other ethnic groups are more politically intertwined. 
Mali 
Mali is split by the Niger River, with about 90% of the population located south of the 
river and the remaining 10% living in the northern area (Pringle 2006). Ethnic groups are split 
among the regions (Stewart 2013), with the Mande people (about half of the population) located 
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in the south, the Peul (roughly 17% of the population) in the Niger Delta, the Songhai (about 6% 
of the population) and the Seina (about 12% of the population) in the southeast, and the Tuareg 
(about 10% of the population) in the north (The World Factbook 2013). 
While ethnically diverse and geographically divided, the norm in Mali tends towards 
interethnic tolerance (Stewart 2013). This norm is facilitated by a historical practice known as 
cousinage, or “joking relationships,” in which people from different ethnic groups and castes can 
share humorous insults with one another, even if strangers. Because it crosses ethnic lines, 
cousinage connects people of different ethnic backgrounds. Dunning and Harrison (2010) show 
that the practice of cousinage therefore makes one unable to predict vote choice in Mali based on 
ethnicity alone. Candidates in joking relationships with the voters tended to be evaluated as 
favorably or more favorably than candidates from the voters’ own ethnic groups. This practice of 
cousinage, then, promotes interethnic cooperation and voting amongst most ethnic groups in 
Mali and contributes to the low ethnic political party score there. 
However, the rebel group participating in Mali’s civil wars, the Tuareg, do not participate 
in cousinage (Dunning and Harrison 2010). The exclusion of the Tuareg from this practice and 
their geographic isolation limits their interconnection with other ethnic groups and may 
contribute to their feelings of political, social, and economic marginalization, which is cited as 
the motivation behind their frequent separatist movements (Asal 2008).  
Nigeria 
Unlike political parties in Mali, parties in Nigeria have been based upon regional ethnic 
grouping since the state’s independence in 1960 (Ajayi 2015). Nigeria has an estimated 250 
ethnic groups. The three principal ethnic groups are divided amongst three main provinces (the 
western, eastern, and northern regions), with the Hausa-Fulani in the north comprising roughly 
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29% of the population, the Igbo in the southeast comprising 21%, and the Yoruba in the 
southwest comprising 18% (The World Factbook 2013). Historically, each region has had 
political parties protecting the individual region’s best interests, with the Action Group (AG) in 
the west, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the north, and the National Council for 
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the east (Ajayi 2015). Being of similar size, no one group 
gained a majority of the votes in the 1959 pre-independence national elections, though each won 
in their home districts. With no clear winner, the NCNC of the east and the NPC of the north 
formed a coalition, split national leadership, and excluded the AG from political power. This 
political exclusion contributed to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967 (Ajayi 2015; 
Irukwu 2014). 
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DISCUSSION 
 For the 27 African states under analysis in this paper, party formation along ethnic 
divisions is associated with an increase in the probability of conflict. Proportional legislative 
electoral systems are associated with a decrease in civil conflicts, though the relationship was not 
statistically significant in any of the models run. Out of the “conditions that favor insurgency” 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003) only GDP per capita is consistently statistically significant throughout 
the models. While this dataset is relatively small, covering only 27 states from the years 2000 to 
2013, the results from this study suggest the importance of studying the degree to which ethnic 
fractionalization defines the way in which a state’s government is formed. If ethnically 
homogenous political parties create more of a division within a society, then a focus should be 
placed on diversification within political parties in order to help reduce the probability of 
conflict. 
 With only 27 countries included in the dataset, I can conclude that, within these states, 
political parties formed along ethnic lines are associated with an increased probability of civil 
conflict. These findings, however, cannot be expanded on a larger scale or to a larger timeframe. 
The African continent and surrounding islands include 53 independent states. While 
Round 5 of the Afrobarometer included 34 states, the questions of interest were only asked in 27. 
This means that 51 percent of the states in Africa are not represented in this study. This has 
larger implications if the states not included are all correlated in some way, especially if their 
exclusion is due to conflict within the states. 
The results in this analysis, though, support further research being conducted on the link 
between ethnic political parties and civil conflict. In order to discuss the larger implications of 
ethnic political parties on civil conflict, one would need to construct a dataset incorporating more 
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countries from more regions and increase the time period under examination. The inclusion of 
political alliances and coalitions would also help to strengthen the arguments made. Conclusions 
from such a study could potentially be applicable when discussing the overall implications of 
ethnic political parties in Africa as a whole. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 9: Example Metric (Benin) 
  
Raw Vote Counts from Cross Tabulation 
 
  Party   
 Group 100 101 102 103 104 105 9995 9997 9998 9999 Total  
 1 20 8 1 0 0 0 0 161 0 0 190  
 10 74 67 3 1 4 0 1 349 3 1 503  
 27 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 38  
 34 52 16 3 0 0 0 1 98 0 0 170  
 102 60 0 2 0 0 1 1 47 0 0 111  
 103 38 0 5 3 0 0 2 24 0 0 72  
 105 33 0 5 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 60  
 107 17 0 2 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 30  
 108 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5  
 109 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 6  
 110 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6  
 9995 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 9  
 Total 325 91 24 4 4 1 5 742 3 1 1200  
 
 
 Edited Vote Counts (9000s and parties not receiving at least 5% 
of one group’s vote removed)  
 
  
 
Party  Proportion 
of Group to 
Total 
 
 
Group 100 101 102 103 Total  
 1 20 8 1 0 29 0.066  
 10 74 67 3 1 145 0.330  
 27 19 0 0 0 19 0.043  
 34 52 16 3 0 71 0.161  
 102 60 0 2 0 62 0.141  
 103 38 0 5 3 46 0.105  
 105 33 0 5 0 38 0.086  
 107 17 0 2 0 19 0.043  
 108 4 0 0 0 4 0.009  
 109 4 0 0 0 4 0.009  
 110 3 0 0 0 3 0.007  
 Total 324 91 21 4 440   
 Proportion 
of Party to 
Total 
0.736 0.207 0.048 0.009 
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(Table 9 continued) 
 Share of the Political Party Within Each Ethnic Group (G)  
  Party   
 Group 100 101 102 103 Total  
 1 0.690 0.276 0.034 0 1.000  
 10 0.510 0.462 0.021 0.007 1.000  
 27 1.000 0 0 0 1.000  
 34 0.732 0.225 0.042 0 1.000  
 102 0.968 0 0.032 0 1.000  
 103 0.826 0 0.109 0.065 1.000  
 105 0.868 0 0.132 0 1.000  
 107 0.895 0 0.105 0 1.000  
 108 1.000 0 0 0 1.000  
 109 1.000 0 0 0 1.000  
 110 1.000 0 0 0 1.000  
 
 Herfindahl (G): The Probability that Two Co-ethnics Support the Same Party  
 Group H(G) Weighted H(G)  
 1 0.553 0.036  
 10 0.474 0.156  
 27 1.000 0.043  
 34 0.589 0.095  
 102 0.938 0.132  
 103 0.698 0.073  
 105 0.771 0.067  
 107 0.812 0.035  
 108 1.000 0.009  
 109 1.000 0.009  
 110 1.000 0.007  
  Total 0.663  
 
 Share of the Ethnic Group Within Each Political Party (P)  
  Party  
 Group 100 101 102 103  
 1 0.062 0.088 0.048 0  
 10 0.228 0.736 0.143 0.250  
 27 0.059 0 0 0  
 34 0.160 0.176 0.143 0  
 102 0.185 0 0.095 0  
 103 0.117 0 0.238 0.750  
 105 0.102 0 0.238 0  
 107 0.052 0 0.095 0  
 108 0.012 0 0 0  
 109 0.012 0 0 0  
 110 0.009 0 0 0  
 Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
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(Table 9 continued) 
 
 Herfindahl (P): Probability that Two People from the Same Party are 
from the Same Ethnic Group 
 
   Party   
  100 101 102 103 Total  
 H(P)  0.147 0.581 0.175 0.625 ---  
 Weighted H(P) 0.108 0.120 0.008 0.006 0.242  
 
 
 
Country Score = Weighted H(G) x Weighted H(P) 
Country Score  =  0.663 𝑥 0.242 = 0.160 
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Table 10: Operational Definitions, Data Sources, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Operational Definition Data Source Descriptive Statistics 
MinorInt 
(𝑌1) 
25 to 999 battle-related deaths UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset 
0 = 334 
1 = 44 
MajorInt  
(𝑌2) 
More than 1,000 battle-related 
deaths 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset 
0 = 371 
1 = 7 
MajorOrMinor 
(𝑌3) 
25 or more battle-related 
deaths 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset 
0 = 327 
1 = 51 
EthnicParty 
(𝑋1) 
 
Probability of two co-ethnics 
being from the same political 
party and two people in the 
same party being co-ethnics 
Original measure Range: 0.03 – 0.66 
Mean: 0.17 
Std. Dev.: 0.15 
ELF  
(𝑋2) 
 
Probability two people 
randomly drawn from a 
country are from different 
ethnic groups 
Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) 
Range: 0.04 – 0.93 
Mean: 0.67 
Std. Dev.: 0.23 
Proportional 
(𝑋3) 
‘1’ indicates a proportional 
legislative electoral system, ‘0’ 
indicates otherwise 
CIA World Factbook 
and Institute for 
Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance 
0 = 270 
1 = 108 
Anocracy  
(𝑋4) 
 
‘1’ indicates a state with a 
Polity2 score between -5 and 
5, ‘0’ otherwise 
Polity IV Political 
Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions dataset 
0 = 195  
1 = 183 
Polity2 
(𝑋5) 
 
A state’s autocracy score 
subtracted from its democracy 
score 
Polity IV Political 
Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions dataset 
Range: -4 – 10 
Mean: 3.99 
Std. Dev.: 4.13 
Oil  
(𝑋6) 
A state’s total oil rents as a 
percentage of the state’s GDP 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Range: 0 – 40.49 
Mean: 1.68 
Std. Dev.: 5.85 
NatRes  
(𝑋7) 
A state’s total natural resource 
rent as a percentage of the 
state’s GDP 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Range: 0.003 – 62.73 
Mean: 11.43 
Std. Dev.: 9.70 
Regional  
(𝑋8) 
‘1’ indicates one or more 
regionally-based ethnic 
groups, ‘0’ otherwise 
Ethnic Power Relations 
dataset 
0 = 70 
1 = 308 
LogPop  
(𝑋9) 
The natural log of a state’s 
population 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Range: 13.99 – 18.97 
Mean: 16.27 
Std. Dev.: 1.08 
Mountain 
(𝑋10) 
The proportion of a country 
that is mountainous 
Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) 
Range: 0 – 82.20 
Mean: 11.42 
Std. Dev.: 20.86 
Durable  
(𝑋11) 
Number of years since the 
most recent regime change  
Polity IV Political 
Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions dataset 
Range: 0 – 47 
Mean: 10.26 
Std. Dev.: 10.09 
LogGDPpc 
(𝑋12) 
The natural log of the GDP per 
capita for each country-year 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Range: 4.66 – 9.16  
Mean: 6.52 
Std. Dev.: 1.02  
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Figure 4: Testing for Outliers in the Probability of Minor Conflict  
 
 
Figure 5: Testing for Outliers in the Probability of Major or Minor Conflict  
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Figure 6: Testing for Outliers in the Probability of Minor Conflict Controlling for 
Proportional Systems 
 
 
Figure 7: Testing for Outliers in the Probability of Major or Minor Conflict  
Controlling for Proportional Systems 
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